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— modest tipping points combining indirectly to produce large failures
— risk-sharing or contagion, as one loss triggers a chain of others
— ‘hysteresis’, or systems being unable to recover equilibrium after a shock.3
Using this definition, in the actions leading to the Great Recession, market or institutional failure did not only affect the market participants in their own transactions. That
would be market risk. Rather, the financial loss spread like a contagion, triggering a chain
of catastrophic shocks to the financial markets, leading to a global economic crisis of
catastrophic proportions.
Such collective harm cases beg for an institutional response. No single action of
any one market participant will be sufficient to mitigate systemic risk. Systemic
risk mitigation requires substantial coordination, ex ante regulation by authorities,
and assurances that regulation will be effective. The law can be designed to either
prevent harm from occurring, to provide compensation or other remedy ex post
in the event harm occurs, or both. It is in large part a problem relating to the
structure of a society, about how institutions shape or limit the range of individual
actions.
Two moral questions are relevant in these contexts. First, does a person have a moral
duty to avoid loss or harm (or risk of loss or harm) to others if her financial transactions
contribute in some way, however small, to the loss or harm? In such cases the actions of
a person, on her own, cause no harm or loss, but when taken together with the actions
of others, causes harm or loss, sometimes substantial harm or loss. I do not mean loss or
harm relating to the bargaining power of persons in a contractual privity relationship,
such as between debtor and creditor. Rather, I mean loss or harm to third persons not
party to any contract with the parties to the transaction. As we shall see, the answer to
this question does not proceed along the lines of a simple generalisation around the idea
of ‘what if everyone did that’?
Second, how should society distribute the risk of loss associated with economic crises?
The distribution to which I refer is not distribution within an exchange or transaction,
for that would take us back into the debtor-creditor relationship, but risk across persons
who may or may not be party to particular exchanges or transactions. The answer to the
first question may be relevant to the second but not in all cases or in all approaches to
answering these questions. The questions are related to the extent that we want to
distribute risks on the basis of some concept of moral responsibility.
For the second question, what is relevant is distribution of burdens and benefits
through regulation by the state.4 The primary aim of egalitarian theory is to mitigate or
eliminate risk to persons in a way that complies with suitable principles of fair distribution.When we look at the collective nature of these risks, we ask how we might distribute
the risk, or at least distribute the burdens of a regulatory regime designed to avoid or
mitigate the risk.
A number of ways to distribute the burdens of risk present themselves to us. We could
distribute on the basis of a consequentialist account of economic externalities and a
requirement that people bear the full social costs for their activities. We could distribute
using a contractualist standard of reasonable rejection, such as on the basis of a
Rawlsian-type difference principle. As I show below, luck egalitarianism offers promise in
working through these issues if we are interested in considerations of both equality and
responsibility.
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These two questions can be understood from interactional and institutional standpoints. For interactional morality, the focus is on individual action. It places demands
directly on persons.5 Another approach is institutional.6 It takes the morality of communities, or what is usually known as political morality, to be primary. Finance is a
human activity, a set of social practices made possible by institutions. These actions,
social practices, and institutions have consequences for persons who engage in financial
transactions as well for the general population, which includes many who do not engage
in financial transactions or engage in transactions with no (or imperceptible) consequences by themselves. We therefore have to ask what moral obligations institutions
‘deliver’ for us as a community.The second approach takes into account that institutions
have great influence on the sorts of risk that might arise in financial markets and how
these risks are distributed. Massively complex financial markets, which connect strangers
in webs of transactions that can span the globe and cross borders with the stroke of a
keyboard, cannot exist without institutions.
This is a work of moral and political philosophy. My aim here is to articulate the moral
concepts that we might want to use either to inform the promulgation of law regulating
financial markets or to justify that law from a moral point of view. The moral theories
applied below cannot tell us, however, which approaches to financial regulation might be
effective in an economic sense, as that is a question of economic policy, not philosophy.
An egalitarian asks, of the menu of available economic policies, which is fair or just in a
distributional sense? This is not to suggest that egalitarian and other moral concerns have
to give way to economic ones or that economics is overriding. In fact a society might
accept some levels of cost and inefficiency to obtain a relatively fairer result in law and
public policy.
We also need to be clear that the discussion proceeds from the assumption that
societies are in a position to maintain adequate credit markets and financial institutions
for the supply of mortgage credit to homeowners, in economic conditions, including
employment conditions and consumption patterns, in which home ownership is economically feasible. This article does not deal with problems of extreme poverty associated with the lack of functioning credit and other market institutions. Having stated this
qualification, the systemic risk flowing from risky financial activities can have serious
adverse affects on countries lacking such institutions as well as their populaces. It is also
important to clarify that the discussion to follow is directed at the home mortgage
market, the collapse of which in specific countries is widely understood to have been a
primary contagion for the Great Recession.

1. Moral Responsibility of Individual Agents
What moral responsibility might an individual agent have in cases in which the agent’s
financial decisions are unlikely to cause financial harm or loss to others on their own but
when accumulated with the decisions of many others risks substantial financial harm?
Preliminarily, I want to rule out the discussion of financial crises for single agents, with
no implications of external effects on others, except possibly for persons with which our
single agent might have some sort of contractual privity. In such cases, moral responsibility may be relevant, if it is true that failure to pay one’s debts through one’s own
fault has moral relevance, though it might not be so easy to distinguish individual
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circumstances from structural causes for a person’s financial problems.7 This article is
not about these cases. Rather, the focus here is on financial crises for states and societies,
which, given the economic interdependence of states, spill over to be international in
effect. The focus in this part of the article is on interactional morality, on the moral
responsibility of persons in these cases.
From the standpoint of individual agency, three conditions are relevant, which we can
specify as freedom-relevant, practical and epistemic.8 The freedom-relevant condition
captures the idea that a person can be morally responsible only if she acts freely. It deals
with the question of alternate possibilities.The basic insight is that we cannot be morally
responsible unless we could do otherwise. This may be false, if compatibilists are right.
A ‘metaphysics free’ version of free agency can be posed here, focusing on the intrusion
of institutions and social structure on agency. Intervention by these socially constructed
forces might take away from the voluntariness of an act and might prevent an agent
from being attributively responsible and hence affect the blameworthiness of an act.9
Or, they might alter the determination of which principles it is reasonable to reject and
therefore affect substantive responsibility, or what an agent owes as moral duties to
others.10 These considerations have special relevance in the case of contributory harm of
the sort we are talking about here, where chains of events might combine to result in
harm to many people. It just might be true, as an empirical matter, that institutions, if
sufficiently pervasive, restrict freedom in such a way as to relieve a person of moral
responsibility.11
The practical condition deals with the question whether a person’s actions make a
difference. Why do we care about the agent’s actions or failure to act? The practical
condition is strictly necessary for a consequentialist argument to be successful.
Consequentialism condemns an act only if it makes a difference. In the case of mass
financial harm of the sort under consideration here, an agent’s act on its own likely does
make a difference, but the difference may be negligible, or, in Derek Parfit’s terminology,
imperceptible. Parfit argues that it is a mistake to claim that if some act produces
imperceptible effects, then it cannot be wrong, because the sum of imperceptible effects
adds up to perceptible effects.The contribution of a single person matters.12 But the sort
of generalisation arguments that consequentalists employ in these kinds of mass harm
cases cannot lead to the conclusion that no one should take action that could result in
harm collectively when many do it.13 There may be some threshold at which some people
doing the particular act might be too low a number to trigger the feared harm, or it may
actually be desirable if those persons so act. A potential weakness for consequentialism
to operate in these complex financial cases is the need for substantial information
available to persons to know which of them can act. It is less demanding on persons if
institutions do the allocating of permissible actions for them.
For contractualists, bad consequences are not dispositive to the outcome of moral
deliberation or appraisal, but are still relevant. The main concern in a contractualist
account is not whether some moral principle prohibits acts that contribute imperceptible
differences to bad consequences but that it might place unreasonably disproportionate
burdens on a person to avoid contributing to harm to others. The focus of contractualist
argument is not on consequences alone or primarily but on why it is wrong to act or not
to act in the face of consequences.
The epistemic condition relates to the knowledge of the agent deliberating on
action. What if an agent neither knows nor should have known that their act causes or
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contributes to harm? There are a number of elements in a full account of the epistemic
condition. For example, George Sher’s ‘full epistemic condition’ or FEC for moral
responsibility specifies a number of conditions for praise or blameworthiness.14 Two of
these conditions very roughly comprise what in the law might be understood as a
negligence standard: ‘knew or should have known’. If a person knows or should know
that their actions harm others, then the epistemic condition is satisfied for declaring their
actions to be wrong. Sher also argues for moral wrongness when some act ‘falls below
some applicable standard’, and ‘is caused by the interaction of some combination of his
constitutive attitudes, dispositions, and traits’.15 This latter standard captures the idea of
greed in a financial context: a greedy person has the wrong constitutive attitudes and is
morally responsible for the financial harm she causes or contributes to, even if she does
not know, nor ought to have known, of the harm. This distinction is important, for
example, to distinguish home lenders who enter into a subprime mortgage to be able to
afford a decent home for their family and those who do so because they have been
irresponsible about credit.
Using the three conditions, we can test out alternative moral principles using wellaccepted constructivist methods. Start with a simple contributory harm principle:
Principle CH: It is wrong to act in ways that contribute to harm to another
person.
What does it mean to contribute to harm to others? The contribution feature in Principle
CH assists in compliance with the practical condition. Implicit in Principle CH is that an
imperceptible difference has moral significance, but we know that an imperceptible
difference on its own is not a significant problem for either consequentialist or
contractualists. The main concern about Principle CH, at least to a contractualist, is not
whether it prohibits acts contributing an imperceptible difference to bad consequences
but that it might place unreasonably disproportionate burdens on a person to avoid
contributing to harm to others.16 This is, in contrast, not a problem for consequentialists.
The disproportionate burdens problem relates not to the practical condition but to the
freedom-relevant condition. Principle CH lacks constraints of reasonableness, core to
contractualism. Principle CH is too demanding to be contractualist though it may work
as a consequentialist principle. Finally, Principle CH does not address the epistemic
condition.
Consider the following modification:
Principle CH1: It is wrong to act in ways that contribute to harm to another
person (or n persons) if an agent’s refraining from acting would not place
disproportionate burdens on the agent.
Notions of reasonableness and separateness of persons come into Principle CH2. They
are essential requirements in contractualism and serve to implement the freedomrelevant condition. These concepts give us some latitude to lessen the demands of
generalisation arguments. The problem with these principles so far, however, is they do
not address the epistemic condition.
What if an agent does not know nor could have known of the effects of her actions
when combined with the actions of numerous others? Agents are unlikely to be morally
responsible for outcomes about which they could not have reasonably known. Our
reactive attitude in such cases will not be to condemn such acts. Moreover, there might
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be cases in which a person does not know or could not have known of the risks associated
with their actions, yet we still might hold them morally responsible if we can point to
some failure to meet an accepted standard of behaviour of the person which would merit
moral responsibility.17 An agent likely has reason to reject attempts to make her morally
responsible for actions she had no way of knowing would result in the harm they cause
or which are not the result of failures to comply with well-accepted standards of
behaviour relating to financial risk. The epistemic condition suggests a further modification of our principle:
Principle CH2: It is wrong to act in ways that contribute to harm to another
person (or n persons) if:
(1a) the agent ‘knew or should have known’ that her actions would contribute
to the harm,
or:
(1b) the agent’s actions fail to meet some applicable standard of behaviour
resulting from a combination of constitutive attitudes, dispositions, and
traits;
and:
(2) the agent’s refraining from acting would not place disproportionate
burdens on her own freedom of action.
Principle CH2 meets all three of our conditions. The harm contribution principle
embedded within it meets the practical condition. The epistemic principles embedded
in 1a and 1b meet the epistemic condition. The disproportionate burdens requirement
in 2 brings Principle CH2 into compliance with the freedom-relevant condition. The
‘some applicable standard’ language in 1b is from Sher’s notion of ‘some standard of
rationality or reasonableness’, which he argues are canonically expressed in tort and
criminal law.18
With Principle CH2 in hand, we can now begin to get more specific about financial
harm contexts. In such contexts, not all of the participants in the collective action that
is causing the harm are doing the same thing. Actors in a financial crisis situation are
differentiated, in a way that makes a difference to moral responsibility. Some of the
relevant agents are unsophisticated consumers. Others are sophisticated financial institutions. The actions of some make a very significant difference to the crisis. Others are
simply first time homebuyers working hard to buy a decent house for their family. Many
individual actions by themselves may have been legally permissible and in fact encouraged by government policy, such as by mortgage securitisation, which the US federal
government has subsidised for many years, partly to encourage individual home ownership by those least able to afford it, though also to support the market for securities
produced from mortgage securitisation, so-called mortgage-backed securities.19
To put some details in the analysis, assume a five-person society comprised of ‘citizen’,
‘lender’, ‘consumer borrower’, and ‘market professional’. We can further divide ‘market
professional’ into sophisticates and non-sophisticates. The lender lends mortgage loans
to the consumer borrower. An example of a market professional who is also a sophisticate
is a financial institution such as a bank, a loan originator or an institution responsible for
securitising mortgages, such as a ‘packager’ of loans.20 An example of a market professional who is probably not a sophisticate is a residential real-estate agent. The financial
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institution could produce and trade in financial products that come from the debt
contracts between borrower and lender. An example of such a product is mortgagebacked securities. The citizen is a representative third party who suffers harm from the
financial activities of the others. The citizen has no moral responsibility but will suffer
great harm and will not be discussed further in this part of the article.
What is the moral responsibility of these archetypes in our idealised society? Much of
what I am about to say is tentative because it depends on empirical considerations and
is therefore outside of the scope of moral philosophy. But we can draw basic conclusions.
Start with the single consumer borrower. An example might be a first time homebuyer
who took out a subprime mortgage. The adverse effects of the subprime mortgage
market on financial markets in the most recent financial crisis are well understood. It
may be privately beneficial for the homebuyer to enter a mortgage that pushes to the
limits of affordability, such as a risky subprime mortgage. It may also be necessary. The
borrower may need to buy the house to get her children into a decent school because her
government fails to provide equality of opportunity in education. She may need to get on
the home-buying ladder to leave an oppressive rental market or because her government
fails to provide decent social housing. Or, she may simply want to buy better accommodation. Other alternatives are that she has poor credit because of bad choices, or is
living beyond her means. Regardless of the reasons why a borrower enters into a risky
mortgage, when many people enter into similarly risky mortgages, the result can be
disastrous.
Let’s apply Principle CH2 to our consumer borrower. Two problems seem apparent,
and they stem from the epistemic condition. First, if we understand Principle CH2 to
reflect consequentialist insights, how does an agent know if they are in the category of
agents who should not take the action resulting in the imperceptible difference? Certainly there will be some level of risky mortgages that will be acceptable or even
beneficial.There may be some optimal number of risky mortgages posing low risks to the
financial system yet benefit poor recipients greatly. Second, how shall our individual
agent weigh or compare good and bad consequences? If she is required to aggregate for
bad consequences for the financial system, should she not also be required to aggregate
for good consequences? It is likely that the consumer borrower cannot meet the ‘knew or
should have known’ standard in Principle CH2. There may however be a ‘greedy homeowner’ category if particular constitutive attitudes make a consumer borrower profligate
or risk friendly. If our consumer borrower does not fall into this category a further
impediment to holding her morally responsible, which comes from Principle CH2’s
contractualist features, is that refraining from entering into a mortgage transaction may
place disproportionate burdens on the consumer borrower’s freedom of action if she is
a first time home buyer trying to enter the property ladder, a parent trying to make a
decent life for her family in an unjust society with inadequate social housing, and so on.
The bottom line is that there will be many contexts in which the consumer borrower is
not morally responsible for mass financial harm.
The lender situation is different. Here we likely have a situation in which Principle
CH2 imposes moral responsibility. The actions of lenders in many cases are likely
to make a significant difference. They have likely significantly contributed to harm.
Some of the more sophisticated market participants knew or should have known that
their risky activities would be the cause of significant financial harm. If they were greedy
or in pursuit of extraordinary profits, their particular constitutive attitudes provide the
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necessary element to comply with the epistemic condition in Principle CH2, regardless
of whether they knew or should have known of the risks. It is doubtful that lenders suffer
disproportionate burdens if they refrain from actions that lead to systemic financial
harm. With the existence of established capital markets in the form of stock exchanges,
the lender’s shareholders have the option to move their financial holdings to other
investments to produce similar returns but which would not contribute to systemic
financial risk. Moral responsibility seems clear in many lender cases.
Consider the sophisticated market professional. Here is a stylised example. ‘Financial
institution’ securitizes home mortgages. They use structured finance to pool loans and
create securities from loan pools, rated and classified by default risk. They know that
some of the mortgages they acquire were created as a result of subprime lending and that
this subprime lending dramatically increases the risk of default by borrowers on loans.
They know that securitization facilitates subprime lending and the benefits from it.They
also know that they are not the only enterprise in the securitization business and that
there is a cascading risk from creating securities from subprime loans that goes beyond
the risk of default by borrowers.21
Principle CH2 seems to clearly place moral responsibility on this sophisticated market
professional to refrain from contributing to systemic financial risk. This financial institution contributes to systemic risk and the harm that follows and knows or should know
that it is doing so. They and their shareholders plausibly have alternative investment
strategies and so could reasonably refrain from contributing to this risk. That they may
make less of a return on investment in these alternative investment strategies may be
true, but their focus only on maximising their own gain regardless of the consequences
is unreasonable and suggests a set of constitutive attitudes that would violate Principle
CH2.
What about unsophisticated market professional? Consider the following example.
‘Real-estate agent’ works hard to assist first time homebuyers in buying houses. She is the
sole wage earner for her family. She does not work on the financing side of the industry.
She is aware that some of her clients enter into subprime mortgages, but she is not
involved in setting up these mortgages. She could try to refer her clients to more
conservative mortgage brokers but her firm requires her to use a particular broker and
if she violated this policy, she could lose her job. Even if she could refer her clients to
other mortgage brokers, there is the possibility that this will reduce her own income
substantially, and she feels that she should be able to rely on the buyer’s own choices in
the matter. Real-estate agent is aware that the above financial institution is securitizing
many of these risky loans and the risky loans of others. She thinks that one day the
bubble will indeed burst.
It is unclear whether Principle CH2 imposes moral responsibility on the real-estate
agent. The conduct of the real-estate agent likely only meets the epistemic conditions of
Principle CH2. She knows there is a problem and her discontinuing her actions might be
the right result if we focus solely on a consequentialist account of imperceptible difference, but under our Principle CH2 requiring that she act might violate the freedom
relevant condition — it may place disproportionate burdens on her freedom of action. It
would benefit society if she stopped working in her line of business but it may be difficult
for us (society) to ask her to do so as a matter of individual choice, unless we give her
other options. Here we see that institutions may be needed to solve this collective action
problem.
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To conclude, this first part of the article is moral philosophy about the actions of
individual agents when faced with financial decision-making. Does a person have a
moral duty to avoid a particular financial transaction or set of financial transactions
that might contribute in some way, however slight, to harm to others who may not
be parties to the transaction or set of transactions? The answer is, it depends. To
get this question to be tractable, I developed a five-person idealised society comprised
of citizen, consumer borrower, lender, and two different kinds of market professionals, depending on the level of their sophistication about finance. I then evaluated
the conduct of these agents using a moral principle that I worked out of the conditions
in which persons might be morally responsible for their individual actions in mass
or collective financial harm cases. Consumer borrowers are unlikely to have moral
duties to avoid financial transactions unless they have some special knowledge of the
effects of their acts on others or if they fail to meet some applicable standard
of conduct, such as when they are risk friendly profligate spenders. The lender is
morally responsible in most cases and will owe duties to avoid financial systemic risk
in their lending activities. The market professional cases are unclear and depend primarily on the level of knowledge of the market professional and their ability to do
otherwise without disproportionate burdens on their livelihood. The citizen is an innocent bystander and has no moral duties in the contexts of individual or interactional
morality.
But our idealized citizen may have a role in promoting institutions to deal with the
problems of collective financial harm. The analysis so far does not deal with the role
of institutions. On the role of institutions, Ullman-Margalit has argued that the generalisation argument is a derivative obligation imposed on individuals, with the
primary obligation on the relevant community to impose these obligations on individual agents.22 According to Ullman-Margalit, the relevant community has the
primary obligation to ‘see to it’ that an appropriate number of community members
do not do the putatively risky or harmful action in question. Obligations on agents will
flow not from interactional morality, or at least not only from interactional morality,
but from the authority of the community to command agents to act or refrain from
acting in particular ways.

2. The Distribution of Systemic Financial Risk
Societies can and do allocate financial risk in a number of ways, either by accident,
design, or a combination of both. Actual policy prescriptions in banking and finance
areas rely primary on concerns about macroeconomics and stability in national economies and the global economy.23 Distributional considerations rarely enter the mix and
when they do, they do so haphazardly. My aim here is to fill that gap by offering a way
to morally justify the distribution of systemic financial risk. As explained below, I develop
an approach relying on resource-based luck egalitarianism to allocate systemic financial
risk.
In addition to morally justifiable legal principles at work in the distribution of systemic
financial risk, we also want the rules to be rational and efficacious. In a wide reflective
equilibrium, we should inquire about non-moral considerations, such as the economic
effects of legal rules. Economics is influential in real-world institutional design and it
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provides tools for understanding how public policy designed around principles of political morality might actually operate in a society.
In economic terms, systemic financial risk is an externality. It contributes to other
externalities in the housing market, such as foreclosure or repossession externalities.24
Financial crises create a classic market failure problem. If firms and individuals act in
their own interest when they make decisions involving financial risk, they take only their
own costs and benefits into account. More accurately, they take into account only costs
they personally bear and benefits they directly receive. Iwan Anabtawi and Steven
Schwarcz describe this as asymmetry in the distribution of gains and losses associated
with financial decisions.25 Financial decisions have undesirable spill-over effects, or what
economists call negative externalities. Firms and individuals often do not bear the full
social costs for their financial activities.
A classic example of these externalities was the effect of subprime lending in the
United States and elsewhere on the global economy, leading to the Great Recession.26
Though some disagreement amongst economists persists about the causes of the
Great Recession, some consensus has emerged. The financial crisis leading to the
Great Recession was in substantial part triggered by a significant weakening of underwriting standards by lenders. This process began in late 2004 and continued on
into early 2007. With the demand for ever-increasing returns from investors,
participants in global financial markets (originators, underwriters, asset managers,
credit rating agencies and investors) became complacent about risk. When realestate prices began to fall in the United States, defaults on subprime mortgages,
many with adjustable rates triggering to higher rates, became substantial. These
events led to a substantial decline in consumption by households. When credit rating
agencies began to downgrade securitisation products, the market began to unravel.
The result was spill-overs with dramatic consequences resulting in the worst economic
crises in recorded history. The spread of loss was like a contagion, spreading
from a few real-estate markets in California and Florida across the globe. The single
participants in these global webs of transactions each privately benefited in particular
transactions but the combination of their actions lead to a collapse of the global
economy.
To bring egalitarianism to the discussion, as in the prior section, assume a fiveperson society comprised of ‘lender’, ‘borrower’, ‘market professional’ and ‘citizen’.
The focus will be on lender, borrower and citizen, as the effects on them will be
most important and effects on market professionals will be overlapping with and deriving from the effects on these primary actors. In addition, without appropriate intervention, the distributional implications favouring the lender over the borrower can be
significant.27
I will go step-by-step through the problem from the standpoint of a prominent version
of luck egalitarianism, known as resource-based luck egalitarianism, the main proponents of which are Ronald Dworkin and Eric Rakowski, though Dworkin did not
consider himself a luck egalitarian.28 I will use Dworkin’s concept of an auction for the
division of resources at the initial stages of society, his concept of hypothetical insurance
to deal with inequalities, and his distinction between brute and option luck. A resourcebased approach to luck egalitarianism allows us to avoid the propensity of welfare
egalitarianism to compensate those who deliberately cultivate expensive tastes and even
those not responsible for their expensive tastes and have so-called bad price luck.29 In a
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resource-based account, we can avoid catering to people with expensive tastes in homes,
or more generally, to people who seek substantial increases in their wellbeing from risky
uses of credit. Government intervention is an admittedly crude instrument for managing
people’s tastes and preferences and we may not care so much about catering to people’s
expensive tastes, even if those tastes are not subject to the control of the people who have
them. We are, rather, concerned about more serious effects of systemic financial risk on
basic levels of need for housing and credit.30
Private home ownership is a resource. As Dworkin argues in the first paragraph of
‘Equality of Resources’, the paper said to have begun modern-day accounts of luck
egalitarianism, ‘equality of resources is a matter of equality in whatever resources are
owned privately by individuals’.31 Dworkin goes on to explain that private ownership ‘is
not a single, unique relationship between a person and a material resource, but an
open-textured relationship many aspects of which must be fixed politically’.32 So,
Dworkin concludes, ‘the question of what division of resources is an equal division must
to some degree include the question of what powers someone who is assigned a resource
thereby gains, and that in turn must include the further question of his right to veto
whatever changes in those powers might be threatened through politics’.33 Rakowski
argues similarly, assuming that the resources available for division would be held privately and limiting his argument to those resources ‘that are placed in individuals’
hands’.34 As we will discover below, when we enquire into the economic incidents of
private home ownership financed by mortgage credit, we can disaggregate private
ownership into a number of other resources.
Let’s take a look at the private ownership rights of our archetypal agents in our
simplified four-person model. We need to identify what could plausibly be identified as
resources to be distributed to and from the various agents. From this position of
identification of resources, we can then decide how to distribute these resources using a
luck egalitarian framework. We will also need to understand the risks associated with
these resource allocations and how to distribute these risks in a luck egalitarian framework, if these risks have the potential to change significant features or the values of these
resources.
The typical mortgage contract allocates rights and responsibilities to lender and
borrower. In the usual arrangement found in countries maintaining substantial owneroccupied residential patterns financed by credit,35 the borrower is a homeowner,
residing in the home. The borrower is the debtor in a relationship of secured credit
with a financial institution serving as the creditor. The resources the borrower receives
are home ownership and credit. If the mortgage has a fixed interest rate, the borrower
enjoys the benefits of that fixed rate and the resulting certainty of fixed payments
over the life of the mortgage. If the mortgage interest rate is adjustable, the borrower benefits from downward interest rate adjustments but bears the risk of upward
adjustments. A significant expected benefit of real property ownership is that the
borrower gets to keep, or effectively ‘owns’, the market appreciation in the value
of the property, though they also bear the full risk of market declines in property
values.
The lender’s resources include those of the typical secured creditor, including return
on investment in home loans in the form of interest on funds lent. For adjustable-rate
mortgages, the lender benefits from interest rate increases but these have to be offset by
increased costs of funds from depositors caused by general interest rate increases in the
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economy. Our model has simplified matters but we could add the resource that a typical
lender does not lend its own funds but the funds of its depositors if it is a deposit
institution such as a commercial bank. A lending resource that a bank has is leverage.
Leverage ratios are a longstanding area of bank regulation. Finally, a lender is a creditor
with a fixed claim on the asset securing the debt, which means that it can repossess the
house serving as the security for the mortgage in the event of the borrower’s default on
the mortgage.
The citizen, a simplification for a typical person outside of the borrower-lender
relationship, has the potential to enjoy economic stability as a result of the mitigation of
systemic financial risk. Economic stability may be seen as a public good in an economic
sense.36 The citizen also benefits from the spread of private home ownership, to the
extent that it benefits the community, as the social science evidence indicates.37
Turning to the risks associated with the resources to be allocated, the lender has a fixed
claim on the borrower and her asset during the duration of the mortgage, though some
sharing of risk occurs on adjustable-rate mortgages. It is fair to say that the lender has a
fairly fixed income stream regardless of the value of the asset or the state of the economy.
A mortgage is a debt contract, and these tend to be inflexible. The borrower benefits
from market appreciation of the value of the house but also bears the risk of the decline
in its value. The borrower bears the risk of default, which includes repossession and
ultimate loss of home, for any number of reasons, either from her own actions or from
a general downturn in the economy in which the borrower is put under the stress of
reduced income or loss of employment. The lender does bear some systemic risk
associated with serial repossessions, as they are in the business of lending and not home
sales and generally disfavour having to deal with large inventories of repossessed houses
in distressed markets. The citizen suffers from the effects of systemic risk and repossession externalities, and this is so regardless of her position in the housing market. The
effects of systemic risk and repossession externalities on the citizen are both specific and
general. The effects on the citizen are specific in a territorial or local sense. A citizen in
a local context (such as in a housing estate) in which there have been substantial
numbers of repossessions will likely suffer substantial loss as their net worth and means
to promote their lives and to support their families decreases. If their net worth is low or
negative to begin with, the harm can be catastrophic. The effects on the citizen are
general in that national and even global economic declines contribute significant harm
to the citizen, particularly if the citizen is of limited economic means.
Now that we have identified the relevant resources and the risks associated with those
resources, the next step is to decide how to distribute them in responsibility-sensitive
ways. Assume that the initial stages of Dworkin’s island auction have occurred. Once the
auction meeting Dworkin’s envy test has concluded, inequalities will still have to be dealt
with as society progresses through subsequent market exchanges and relationships.
Dworkin developed the notion of hypothetical insurance to determine which inequalities
would be justifiable.38 The hypothetical insurance procedure is designed to be ambition
sensitive but not endowment sensitive, which means that differences in people’s ambitions might result in unobjectionable inequalities but that inequalities from endowments
such as disabilities, native talents, or accidents of birth should be neutralised.
The hypothetical insurance model can be adapted for the situation here. For Dworkin,
insurance ‘provides a link between brute and option luck, because the decision to buy or
reject catastrophe insurance is a calculated gamble.’39 We do the same thing here,
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analogizing home mortgage defaults of the serial nature at issue here to be a catastrophe,
albeit of an economic kind. The question becomes: how to neutralise bad brute luck in
mortgage transactions and systemically? In a hypothetical decision making process about
whether to buy insurance, which kinds of bad brute luck would it be rational for the
borrower and the citizen to reject? The notion of insurance is a tempering device to get
persons behind a veil of ignorance to assess what their insurance needs might rationally
be in the mortgage market. We want to assess what a rational person would be willing to
pay in insurance premiums ex ante to avoid risk in that market. In this process, we also
will assess what a hypothetical insurer would be willing to underwrite. Of course, we
need to take into account that our insurer is hypothetical and that in actual practice there
may be no insurer willing to underwrite the risks we deal with here.
Dworkin’s distinction between brute luck and option luck tells us a great deal about
the distribution of systemic financial risk. The distinction between ordinary market risk
and systemic risk aligns closely with Dworkin’s distinction between option luck and
brute luck. According to Dworkin, ordinary market risk is not morally arbitrary, in the
sense that people who make market decisions ‘take a gamble’, and are subject to option
luck.40 In this account, making a market decision is a choice. The harm associated with
systemic financial risk, in contrast, seems a clear case of bad brute luck. Systemic
financial risk has the potential to harm someone even if they had nothing to do with the
transactions causing the harm. Exposure to systemic financial risk is an unfortunate
circumstance having nothing to do with choosing but with being a participant in a
market economy. In the context of the global financial crisis, a person like our citizen was
out of the market entirely, without any mortgage, not involved in financial markets in any
way, and yet losses cascading systemically through the financial system and the economy
as a result of the actions of others caused her substantial loss of resources.
But the distinction between brute and option luck, reflecting a distinction between
choice and circumstances, might not be easy to make in many cases.41 The elusiveness of
the distinction can be handled in two ways. First, as explained below hypothetical
insurance rules out insuring against expensive tastes. Second and alternatively, Richard
Arneson offers a solution to this problem by asking us to distinguish between choice and
desert-catering luck egalitarianism.42 Choice is essential but background facts also need
to be considered. Here, we may give some latitude to borrowers with particular characteristics. Principle CH2 reflects the notion of desert. Assume two borrowers enter into
identical risky mortgages they can barely afford.We might want to neutralise the bad luck
of a borrower who is a first time home buyer, has been prudent with her finances, is in
need of a decent home for her family with good schools, is in no position to know of the
imperceptible effects of her risky mortgage on others, and may have a limited understanding of the effects of a risky mortgage on herself.43 On the other hand, a profligate
big spender with expensive tastes who pushes herself to the limits of affordability so that
she can have a house she can conspicuously show off to her friends and colleagues will
be less deserving of relief. We can, however, keep our account parsimonious and rely on
the hypothetical insurance procedure to deal with this particular problem.
With the above established we are now in a position to assess the risks our agents want
to insure and whether a prudent insurer in our hypothetical world would provide the
insurance at a premium our agents would be prepared to accept.44 Let’s start with
the borrower. Assume the borrower does not know her personal traits, whether she is the
profligate big spender or first time home buyer, whether her actions will contribute to
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systemic financial risk, whether she will be adversely affected by systemic financial risk,
whether she is rich or poor, or whether she has expensive tastes and bad price luck. In
these hypothetical conditions, the borrower would want to insure against risk of loss of
adequate housing resulting from adverse economic conditions or the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Adequacy of housing can be assessed relative to the
society in which the borrower lives.45 The borrower would want to insure against
catastrophic loss of housing as a result of significant economic crises. The borrower
would not, however, insure to have significant housing wealth relative to other society
members, or against extravagant tastes in housing. Very few people in a society acquire
significant housing wealth or have extravagant tastes, and so the probability of a person
being in these categories outside of the veil of ignorance is low. Alternatively stated, the
risk of being not wealthy is very high and so the premiums to insure against it would be
prohibitive.46
Short of outright loss of home, the borrower would likely find it problematic to bear
all or a significant proportion of the risk of loss from severe decline in home values. It is
plausible to believe that she would want insurance coverage similar to natural disaster
insurance. If a borrower were to lose a home or if the home were significantly damaged
as a result of fire or a tornado, the borrower would likely have insurance to cover such
losses.47 In fact natural disaster insurance is usually required as a condition in a mortgage
contract.
Finally, the borrower behind a veil of ignorance might also find it problematic if others,
such as the lender or its constituencies, such as the lender’s shareholders and depositors,48 were to benefit from her bad brute luck.49 Our borrower would probably not want
the lender to benefit from the borrower’s default on a mortgage, resulting in borrower’s
loss of her home. In addition, such a structure of the debt contract would produce poor
incentives for the lender and hold the borrower hostage to the acts of predatory lenders.
The borrower would want the lender to share in the downsides the borrower faces in the
housing market. In short, no good brute luck from bad brute luck.
As for the lender, there is substantial evidence that financial institutions have for many
years pre- and post-Great Recession sought and obtained de facto insurance in the form
of regulatory capture.50 Regulatory capture occurs when a government regulator, ostensibly acting in the public interest, furthers the interests of firms being regulated rather
than the beneficiaries of the regulation. Applying the regulatory capture insight to
financial institutions, the argument would be that financial institutions effectively buy
insurance in the form of protective regulation.51 A possible example of regulatory capture
is the ‘banks are different’ rationale that regulators have offered for subsidizing large
banks instead of homeowners.52 There may be sound economic reasons for protecting
the payment system that banks provide for the economy, which would include deposit
protection, a longstanding form of banking regulation going back to the early 20th
century.53 But in the application of egalitarian theory to financial regulation post-Great
Recession, the interests of lenders and their shareholders and non-depository creditors
are entirely instrumental. Financial activity is not an end in itself but an instrument for
producing economic wellbeing in a market-oriented economy. If relatively more wellbeing could be produced by other forms of economic organisation that do not involve
financial institutions, then financial institutions would lose the justification for their
existence and it would be entirely appropriate to liquidate them all and prohibit their
activities.54 The point here is that we do not have to determine what sorts of insurance
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a lender might want or need in our hypothetical insurance market. At least in egalitarian
theory as it is applied here, their interests are subordinate to those of others.
The citizen is interested in the public good of economic stability and, if we accept
the principal tenets of egalitarian theory, some form of distributive justice in the allocation of resources essential for pursuing one’s life projects.55 The citizen is an archetype for the average person in a society or the average member of a social contract.
Whilst much has been written about distributive justice, the public good of economic
stability needs justification. The notion of a public good is from economics. A public
good has two essential features: it is non-excludable and non-rivalrous, which means
that persons cannot be effectively excluded from use of the good and use by one
person does not reduce the availability of the good to others.56 To insure that the
public good of economic stability continues unabated, systemic financial risk and
repossession externalities, which we can classify as public bads, need to be mitigated
or eliminated. The citizen would want to insure against these public bads. To do this,
we would want to monetize the relevant externalities to the extent feasible. The idea
would be to give our citizen a right to stability in her economic affairs. The right could
then become a resource to be insured (or traded). Our archetypal lender could be
required to compensate the citizen for the risk of economic instability. The compensation could be hypothetical in the sense that the lender could be regulated in such a
way that alters the distribution of burdens and benefits on lender and citizen, as well
as on the borrower and others. We know that in actual capital markets, excessive
volatility in asset prices is not actually priced into the market and not something that
can be covered by actual insurance.57 But in our hypothetical insurance market, a
rational citizen behind the veil of ignorance would likely want to insure economic
stability but minimize restrictions on borrowing by deserving borrowers in need of
adequate housing. The citizen would want decent levels of adequate housing to be
covered because the citizen does not know her position in the housing market and
would want to insure a basic minimum for herself. Minimally adequate housing is a
resource that is essential for a decent life. As well, the citizen would want others to
have adequate housing, given the substantial benefits to society of people living stable
lives in homes they own. The citizen would likely insure its right to stability to the
point of reasonable economic prosperity and to avoid severe economic declines and
volatility in the housing market. It would likely insure to reduce the risks of the public
bads to some reasonably acceptable level, subject to the proviso that no vulnerable
group would bear disproportionate burdens.
The final step is to transform the results of the hypothetical insurance process into
government policy. Recall Dworkin’s point that rights to resources are ‘fixed politically’.58 As explained above, the borrower would insure against loss of adequate housing,
risky crisis-prone economic conditions, disproportionate risk bearing on its mortgage,
and undeserved benefits to others from its bad brute luck in home ownership.The citizen
would look to minimize the public bads of economic instability from severe decline in
home values and other economic shocks.
Any number of policy recommendations could flow from these results, but one
overriding result seems to be that borrowers and other vulnerable groups should not bear
disproportionate burdens when policies are designed to mitigate or eliminate systemic
financial risk and the externalities of economic crises. I call this the priority of risk
assignment principle. It can be stated in shorthand as follows:
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Law and public policy to prevent or mitigate the effects of economic crises,
when those crises relate to volatility in the financial system, should be designed
to avoid imposing unreasonable burdens on persons who, as a result of bad
brute luck, have not acted in ways to deserve the imposition of those burdens
upon them.
It is doubtful that governments have applied something like a priority of risk assignment principle when devising law and policy to mitigate or eliminate the risks under
consideration here. Policies developed in early efforts to stabilise economies were
morally problematic at best.59 They included massive subsidizing of banks that were
considered ‘too big to fail’ and little if any relief for borrowers. In fact many borrowers
were made worse off because of the severe tightening of credit for borrowers least able
to afford mortgages.60 This is a policy of reverse-prioritarianism, based on a priority for
the better off.
Policies that came later are not much better. As an example, consider the UK’s
Mortgage Market Review (MMR), which imposed obligations on lenders to assess the
affordability of mortgages as a condition for mortgage approval.61 The US Dodd Frank
Act imposes similar ‘ability to pay’ obligations.62 Imposing affordability requirements
may reduce repossession externalities but at a substantial cost to a fair distribution of
risk. The lenders will simply pass on the costs of prevention embedded in the
affordability requirement to borrowers. Banks will do this by increasing rates of interest
to compensate for risk, their traditional method for dealing with increased borrower risk,
though they may not need to resort to this with strict affordability requirements. It is
unlikely that they would go so far as to use the risky mortgage terms and conditions
found in subprime mortgaging, such as balloon payments, or even interest-only mortgages on an extensive basis, as these methods (quite rightly) are now very tightly
restricted. Regrettably, they will reduce their costs by reducing the pool of potential
borrowers. The costs they are limiting are the costs of lending in the form of risk of
liability for lending to those unable to afford mortgages. The affordability requirements
attempt to internalise the costs of the public bads onto banks, but banks will simply shift
these costs onto consumers least able to afford loans and in need of such loans in many
cases. Our deserving first time, young families, and lower income homebuyers will be
unable to enter the housing market. With the decline in home ownership comes reduction in the benefits of home ownership to communities and the elimination of largest
single source of wealth for individuals in societies with significant private home ownership.63 The affordability rules have only recently been promulgated and empirical studies
will soon be needed to assess impact. Bank balance sheets should however improve, with
fewer but higher quality mortgage loans on the books.
Affordability policies by themselves are problematic but they may be coupled with
other policies to decrease burdens on vulnerable populations. Governments could, for
example, combine affordability requirements with assistance to particular groups of
persons who have traditionally experienced difficulties in meeting affordability requirements, such as first time homebuyers.The UK government has, for example, put in place
a ‘Help to Buy’ loan scheme to provide £9.7 billion to help eligible applicants into home
ownership, as well as subsidies to the construction sector.64 It is too early to assess the
effectiveness of these schemes. Critics argue that Help to Buy programmes cause the
very risk they try to alleviate, in particular systemic risk flowing from upward volatility
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in house prices, or so-called housing bubbles.These concerns are likely to be exaggerated
because help to buy does not exist in isolation but is combined with restrictions on
mortgage lending such as affordability requirements and with subsidies to the construction sector to build new homes. They also account for a fraction of the housing market.
It is beyond egalitarian theory, however, to critically assess these economic effects.
A way around these criticisms would be to fundamentally alter the terms of the
mortgage contract. A mortgage is debt and with debt comes an inflexible set of fixed
claims of creditors on debtors. Debt is conceptually oppositional to insurance at its root.
Atif Mian and Amir Sufi argue that ‘debt is the anti-insurance. Instead of helping to
share the risks associated with home ownership, it concentrates the risks on those least
able to afford it’.65 By this they refer to what happens when house prices experience a
steep decline in an economic crisis. As explained above, the mortgage contract places all
risk of housing value declines on the borrower, the person usually most deserving of help
and least deserving of shouldering all of this risk. As Mian and Sufi explain:
When house prices in the aggregate collapse by 20 per cent, the losses are
concentrated on the borrowers in the economy. Given that borrowers already
had low net worth before the crash (which is why they needed to borrow), the
concentration of losses on them devastates their financial condition. They
already had very little net worth — now they have even less.66
The situation they describe differs fundamentally from the way that insurance operates.
In an insurance context, the losses would be ‘covered’ in the sense that the insurance
would compensate the borrower for the loss. In the hypothetical insurance market
worked out above, the borrower would want to be insured against the catastrophic loss
associated with the loss of her home as a result of an economic crisis.
In contrast to the loss that the borrower incurs in the face of steep declines in housing
values, the lender suffers significantly less. As Mian and Sufi explain, using the concept
of ‘savers’ to represent the claims underlying those of the Lender:
In contrast [to the substantial losses borrowers incur in a collapse of housing
prices], the savers, who typically have a lot of financial assets and little mortgage
debt, experience a much less severe decline in their net worth when house prices
fall. This is because they ultimately own — through their deposits, bonds, and
equity holdings — the senior claims on houses in the economy.67
Mian and Sufi advocate a ‘shared responsibility mortgage’ or SRM, a hybrid concept
with features of both debt and equity.68 While the UK mortgage market is overwhelmingly in adjustable-rate mortgages, which soften the blow to borrowers in economic
declines, because interest rates decline as well in such periods, an SRM goes further. An
SRM would be linked to a local house price index. If house prices rise or remain the
same as when the mortgage was entered, the monthly mortgage payment stays the same,
as does the mortgage amortization schedule. If the house price index falls below the level
it was when the borrower entered into the mortgage, the monthly mortgage payment
reduces but the mortgage amortization schedule remains the same. This results in an
automatic but temporary reduction of the mortgage principal. It is temporary because
house prices tend to increase the longer the time period in which they are considered. So,
when the local house price index increases, the mortgage payment and principal will
revert to its initial state.To eliminate or reduce the possibility that the lender will increase
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mortgage interest rates to compensate for its risk in sharing the downside potential of the
housing market, the SRM could give the lender, say, a five per cent share of the capital
gain when the home is sold or refinanced.
The SRM is just one policy proposal that seems to comply with the luck egalitarian
requirements set forth in the priority of risk assignment principle. Others are possible.
It is beyond our scope here to exhaustively identify these options, but rather to
elucidate why such options are necessary to achieve just results in the markets for
mortgage credit.

Conclusion
This article deals with one of the most complex areas of human interaction. What
makes systemic financial risk even more difficult to take on in philosophy is that the
workings of financial markets tend to be fully understood only by a relatively small
number of specialists in economics and finance. Financial markets are, however, totally
of our doing. We create them. Our social practices and our actions determine who gets
what, who loses, and who gains. I have made what I consider to be an early first step
in seeking to understand how persons should act when they are part of large groups of
people making financial choices beneficial to each of them individually but substantially harmful to many others. In addition, we want to know how to distribute the
systemic financial risk associated with these individual actions. To date, the overwhelming focus of inquiry has been in economics and finance, disciplines that have not
traditionally focused on egalitarian concerns. I have attempted to steer this debate
towards a discussion of the distributive implications of law and policy, looking to luck
egalitarian theory to provide some tentative answers, with a focus on the paradigmatic
transaction, that of buying a home with a mortgage that many individuals, often vulnerable, have to deal with if they are to pursue their life projects. Luck egalitarianism,
I contend, offers substantial promise in helping societies reach consensus on how
to allocate the burdens and benefits of financial regulation designed to mitigate or
eliminate systemic financial risk.69
John Linarelli, Durham Law School, Durham University, Palatine Centre, Stockton Road,
Durham, DH1 3 LE, UK. john.linarelli@durham.ac.uk.
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cost, to cover the potential loss. When we talk about who bears a risk we ask who bears the cost of a
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section to follow, a focus on desert rather than on choice can help to deal with when so-called bad brute luck
should be neutralized in debt contracts.
8 I adapt the ‘freedom-relevant’ language and concept from John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds),
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 8. For a full account on
the epistemic condition, see George Sher, Who Knew?: Responsibility Without Awareness (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009).
9 I use here Scanlon’s distinction between attributive and substantive responsibility. T.M. Scanlon, What We
Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 248–294.
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11 A contractualist might base the freedom-relevant condition on Scanlon’s Causal Thesis. Ibid., pp. 261–276.
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his failure to recognize which
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evidence for its rightness or prudence to enable him to perform the act on that basis.
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properly objective and expansive ‘should have known’ element, but I will take Sher’s approach as stipulated
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despite their lack of awareness of the harm their risky action produces.
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